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When the State is not a State and Why the State is a State: The Conversations of 




Based on research data collected in Somalia from May 2015 until August 2016, this 
paper empirically analyses the internal dynamics and external dimensions of the 
statebuilding trajectories of Somalia and Somaliland. By looking at how postcolonial 
structures configured the form and faces of stateness, the paper evaluates the internal 
dynamics and external dimensions of past and present politics of Somalia and 
Somaliland to offer empirical and theoretical contributions to why the attempts at 
peacebuilding and statebuilding projects in Somalia fail from time to time and why 
Somaliland, by contrast, remains a contrary to such an extent as a unique in both 
peacebuilding and statebuilding. The comparisons and contrasts between the two 
entities vary, but the paper shows that there are more dissimilarities than similarities, 
such as structural differences, state differentiations, contrasting actors and different 
stakes. Although assessing institutions and actors reveal why a state is a state in 
Somaliland, examining the state structures in place and the stakes being competed 
demonstrate why power struggle and resource competition become violent in Somalia. 
The paper contributes to the research on peacebuilding and statebuilding in war-torn 
societies as well as on post-war construction and political conflict in Africa. 
Introduction 
 
On a warm Sunday at noon, 10 July 2016, I flew from Aden Abdulle’s International 
Airport in Mogadishu and within less than an hour and a half, the African Airways 
landed at Egaal International Airport in Hargeysa. My mind began to plunge into a deep 
reflection of the political lives of those who were named after the airports: Aden Abdulle 
Osman, known as Aden Adde ‘Aden the White’, an Italian-trained southern 
businessman, and Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egaal, a norther British-trained politician. 
Aden Adde was the Speaker of the Assembly in Somalia under the UN Trusteeship soon 
before independence, while Egaal as the Prime Minister of British Somaliland oversaw 
the entity to unite Somalia on 1 July 1960. Somaliland proclaimed independence on 26 
 
 
June (year), four days before Somalia. United together, they formed The Somali 
Republic. Thirty years later, on 18 May 1991, Somaliland declared to have ‘reclaimed’ its 
sovereignty and established the Somaliland State (Ahere 2013; Bradbury 2008; Lewis 
2008; Renders 2012; Richards 2014; Walls 2014). The singularity of one single Somalia 
has withered away, with the designation of ‘Somalia’ being enlarged itself into 
contemporary ‘Somalias’, but Aden Adde represents a unified one single Somalia, at 
least theoretically. Egaal, by contrast, stands in practice as the founder – or the father – 
of Somaliland, basically the man who built on the entity from the scratch. Egaal achieved 
a unique state-building from below, while Aden Adde avoided to arbitrate the war-
weary political groups and retreated to his farm. The Aden and Egaal names given to 
Mogadishu and Hargeysa airports are not only ophthalmic illustration that Somalia and 
Somaliland have taken two contrasting routes of statebuilding, but a manifestation that 
both have pursued two peacebuilding practices through paradoxical paths.  
 
To mediate these two different political or practical trajectories of statebuilding and 
peacebuilding in Somalia and Somaliland requires a critical consideration of the recent 
past and present. While Somalia followed – and continue to follow – peacebuilding and 
statebuilding projects from the top and largely externally-imposed from the outside by 
the international community, Somaliland pursued statebuilding and peacebuilding 
processes from below – that is, community level accords shunned with milk and peace 
centred on the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms (Academy for Peace and 
Development 2015). The management of the Mogadishu and Hargeysa airports clearly 
shows the two routes. The security of the Mogadishu airport is administered by the 
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Carry-on bags and other passengers’ 
baggage, including mine, were checked by guide dogs directed by Ugandan soldiers, 
while Somali passengers appeared aghast being checked by a beast prohibited by their 
religion to touch or be touched. This was not the case in Somaliland which governs for 
and by itself from an income generated by its public. The Egaal airport is a rare site 
where Somaliland finds a symbolic state recognition for issuing passports and security 
checks, the place where ‘the state begins and ends’ (Gandrup 2016: 3). On the queue at 
the Hargeysa airport, young immigration officers began to ask African Airways 
passengers for their identity papers. Most of the passengers from Mogadishu insisted 
that they did not have papers. ‘After all’, they said, ‘we are Somalis’, a reminder to the 
 
 
Somaliland authorities that they are in a territory still legally part of Somalia. The most 
senior immigration officer, acting in a quiet and calm manner, listened sympathetically 
to the pleas by Mogadishu passengers. Without demanding a bribe, a common practice 
in Mogadishu, the officer allowed passengers to proceed to the counter to get an entry. 
 
In the introduction to his edited volume, Perilous States: Conversation on Culture, 
Politics, and Nation, Marcus (1993) proposed that in-depth conversations produce fresh 
perspectives on unprecedented and unsettling political problems. The practical security 
arrangements pursued that warm Sunday at the Aden Abdulle airport and continued to 
present contrarily at the Egaal airport with the background of the political 
contextualisation remains a precedent of the beginning of the crucial conversations for 
statebuilding and peacebuilding in Somalia and Somaliland.1 Internally and externally, 
Somalia is known as the world’s most failed state (Koskenmäki 2004: 1), while 
Somaliland is promoted as an exceptional case of ‘successful post-war political 
reconstruction’ (Renders 2013: 3).2 While Somaliland was relatively succeeded to 
establish a state capable of providing peace and security, Somalia is still in perpetual 
conflicts and persistent civil wars. The state as a source of competition was charted in a 
critical juncture between the continuation of disintegration, as is Somalia, or promising 
configuration, as it has become in Somaliland (Villalon and Huxtable 1998). Though 
weakened by the ousted regime, the social fabric and the kinship ties became intact in 
the North, whereas it was collapsed with the regime in the southern part of the 
country.3 Migdal’s (1988) discussion of states as empirical realities versus a set of 
practices or idea of quasi-states and state sovereignty or even work on ‘twilight’ states 
can be useful to explore the political condition between Somalia and Somaliland. What 
they are meant to look like and what they ought to look like are profoundly different 
from what they really look like. The existing literature on Somalia and Somaliland fail to 
clarify how and why the structural divergences in relation to conceptual and 
methodological dilemmas of statebuilding and peacebuilding have seldom been 
                                                          
1
 For the role of the airport in the statebuilding of Somaliland, see (Gandrup 2016). 
2
 Lewis (2014) makes a Somalia-type sketch of Somaliland that is likened to Yemen, seeing both as ‘unstable 
governance’ zones. This description is conflicting given the empirical evidence gathered from the field. 
3
 The North stands for Somaliland and the South means Somalia. Throughout this paper, we use interchangeably 
the South and the North to capture the nuances of post-colonial and post-Siad Barre political and socio-
economic conditions of Somalia and Somaliland. 
 
 
examined.4 Much has been written on both entities, yet the paradoxical patterns of their 
statehood are less understood. Political scientists have remained reticent about delving 
deeper into the different historical trajectories of the politics of Somalia and Somaliland, 
with few notable exceptions (e.g. Walls 2014). 
 
The important question that this paper sets out to answer is Consider What is the 
nature of the state in Somalia and how does it contrast in Somaliland? The paper 
explains why peace has become a problem and state a liability in Somalia and how state 
was established and peace realised in Somaliland. It does so not by focusing on 
interstate conflict, but by comparing and contrasting the structural state modes and 
means, particularly how the present and past politics influence the patterns of 
peacebuilding and the model of statebuilding. Drawing on Brosché and Höglund (2016) 
who make central in their analysis of statebuilding and peacebuilding in war-torn 
societies by bringing actors, institutions and stakes actors to the centre of conceptual 
discussion, the paper takes these three key components as an analytical framework. 
However, the paper develops this innovative theoretical framework to include 
structural state systems and clan politics to capture the nuances and situate the 
empirical reality on the ground. The paper argues that statebuilding and peacebuilding 
in Somalia and Somalia is shaped by many layers, such as the variances of the 
postcolonial state structure and institutionalised clan politics, the manipulation of state 
actors and fluctuating stakes. Through the assessment of actors and institutional clan 
politics and stakes, the paper reveals institutional and structural state differences 
revealed by the differentiation of contrasting actors and high politico-economic stakes. 
As noted by Renders (2012: 4-5): ‘Formal and informal elements [of state structures 
can] coexist, overlap, intertwine and influence each other. Institutions do not exist in a 
socio-political vacuum. Neither do the actors concerned stick mechanically to their 
institutionally prescribed behaviour, discourse, and modes of action’. 
 
Based on an ongoing qualitative ethnographic observation  conducted in Somalia and 
Somaliland, the paper proposes that Somalia and Somaliland, which provide empirical 
evidence for the paradoxical trends of the conflicting statehoods, need to come to terms 
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with their past to deal with the present. For many years, political and economic 
conditions in Somalia make it a difficult place to gather information. Personal insecurity, 
the political climate of uncertainty, combined with daily economic hardship confronting 
the masses, made the collection of systematic data difficult. Researchers intent on 
examining Somali issues preferred to gather their data in other relative peaceful parts, 
such as Somaliland. Hardly do researchers try to carry out research in war-torn Somalia 
where suicidal attacks and explosions are recurring. Data was collected from news 
reports, content analysis of primary documents, focus group discussions, ongoing 
ethnographic (participant-observer) observations. Data was collected through focus 
group discussions and repeat semi-structured formal and informal interviews (both in 
public and in private) with academics, businessmen, bystanders, political players, 
traditional clan headmen, UN staff and countless ordinary people (altogether 157 
persons). Research was also conducted in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya in 2015 and 
2016. 
The Past Plunders and the Present Politics 
 
The Differentiation of Structural State 
The roots and realities of the structural state historicity in both Somalia and Somaliland 
had its origins within the altered approaches of the European colonialism which carved 
the Somali territories in the Horn of Africa into five territories. Two of these were ruled 
by the British, the rest three by the French, the Italians and the Ethiopians (Brons 2002; 
Drysdale 1964; Lewis 2002; Mohamed 2007). The British designated their portion 
British Somaliland, the Italians named their chunk ‘Somalia Italiana’ (Italian Somalia). 
The British created a state system in the North that contrasted starkly with the system 
in the South (Contini 1969), that was characterised by transparent  institutional 
structures but more dependent on the clan system compared to  the South where the 
Italian colonial authorities preferred total domination to rule over clans. Hence two 
paradoxical state structural systems developed; one purely British, and the other totally 
Italian. The British model was based on an indirect rule system of governance, basically 
a protectorate, while the Italian state model was more or less a direct rule governance 
system, a colony for that matter. Both colonial systems of governance, however, 
pursued a ‘decentralised despotism’ (Mamdani 1996: 37) to administer their ‘unruly’ 
 
 
Somalis (Gustavo 1939; Hanley 2004 [1971]). What difference has a dual colonial state 
system made on the Somalis who lived in Somalia versus those of Somaliland? If 
colonialism had a deep structural impact on Somaliland so too was Italian colonialism 
(especially with its fascist period) in Somalia. If the real and persistent differences 
between the British and the Italian rule, surely their impacts must have, perforce, been 
different too. 
 
Somaliland is an older sister of Somalia. Somalis in Somaliland negotiated their 
independence with the British on their own at Lancaster House in London in July 1959 
(Colonial Office 1960; Somaliland 1960). Somalia’s case was different since it was 
debated in the UN General Assembly in November 1949 (Cassanelli 1994; Iman 2015; 
Trunji 2015). The birth of the Somali nation-state was confirmed on 1 July 1960, with 
the jubilation of the Somali masses, activated by the activities of the nationalist 
movements borne out during the World War II.5 The idea for amalgamation between 
the two entities emanated from a motion issued in April 1960 by the Legislative Council 
of British Somaliland, collectively calling for a union with Somalia (The Times 1960a; 
The Times 1960b; also Lewis 1962; 162; Renders 45; Tripodi 1996: 93). The fusion was 
legitimised by an act of union complemented by a popular support from the public, 
particularly Southerners. From Somalia and Somaliland union, the Westminster-style 
British parliamentary system of the North was to be superseded by the Palazzo 
Montecitorio-style of Italian parliamentary system in the South (The Constitution of the 
Somali Republic, Article 1). The only difference was that, where the Italian Parliament 
followed bicameral, the Somali became unicameral. 
 
The evolution of The Somali Republic was an accidental state from the first place. The 
joyful experience of the union was interrupted by the clear remainder that the new 
republic was celebrated with an incomplete sense of statehood as three other Somali 
territories were under occupation. Aden Adde compellingly affirmed, in what was his 
first speech to the outside world, during the formation of the Organisation of African 
Union (OAU) in 1963 that the Somali Republic will peacefully seek to merge with other 
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 ‘Aden Abdille Osman iyo Malinti Xoriyada’, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OmbcBMYbaNc (between 
min. 00:01 – 1:43), accessed on 19 July 2016); ‘Waraysi dhaxalgal ah oo Marxuum Cigaal lagula yeeshay 




missing Somali territories (The Ethiopian Observer 1963: 45-48). The smooth transition 
from decolonisation to post-colonial rule meant a continuation of the colonial state 
bedecked with Somali faces. The aspirations and ambitions of the political players and 
bystanders from the North, as difficult as it was, immediately clashed with those from 
the South. The northerners were quick to express and articulate their grievances 
through oral poetry and, at times, through stone throwing. Shortly following 
independence, one aggrieved poet from the North expressed his people’s outrage in a 
poetic euphemism, describing the defunct British Somaliland not less than an 
abandoned betrothed lady.6 This was designed – or destined – to demonstrate that the 
union project had been invalid in the eyes of the people in the North. The failure of the 
new postcolonial leaders to reconsider the growing grievances against the new power 
dispensation by a considerable number of citizens contributed to the loss of state 
legitimacy and public support by Northerners (General Elmi Sahal Ali, telephone 
interview, 23 June 2014; Urdoh 1967: 20). 
 
The Beginning of Discontent 
 
The conversations of statebuilding in The Somali Republic began as a political bargain 
anchored on which clan should take what. The conventional clan wisdom as a crucial 
factor to which clan consideration had to be conferred determined that the President 
and the Prime Minister should not belong to the same clan-group. This wisdom carried a 
cloaked clause of power-sharing gentleman’s agreement between Hawiye and Daarood 
political players, an agreement that put other major clans, such as the Isaaq, the 
predominant clan in the North, as well as the Digil/Mirifle, on the periphery (for clan 
analysis, see Mansur 1995). The conventional power dispensation was the Hawiye for 
the post of the presidency, the Daarood for prime Minister and the Isaaq for speaker of 
the parliament.7 Aden Adde was persuaded by the Daarood political players that the 
Hawiye and the Isaaq constituted the Irir genealogical ancestry, so the distribution for 
powerful political positions had to be based on the Irir and the Daarood basis. Since he 
was an Irir, Aden Adde was told to choose a prime minister from the Daarood clan-
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 The poet chanted: ‘For the marriageable Haweeyo, my mates advised me to wed) / While she gave me a green 
light, I left her alone) / It is me who brought this spiteful upon myself) / All ye who feel as I do, do not spurn 
sovereignty)’ (For details, see Johnson 2010: 231). 
7
 The speaker of the parliament was not sufficient and the Isaaq élites never felt satisfied with it (Ghalib 1994). 
 
 
group. When Aden Adde became the first President of the Republic, most Somalis 
expected him to give the position of the prime minister to Egaal, but his failure to do so 
led to unforgivable memories (field notes, Hargeysa, July-August 2016). Instead, he 
appointed prime minister Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke from the Majeerteen, the clan of his 
formidable wife Asha Elmi Mataan. The unusual appointment, fomented élite animosity 
between Isaaq and Majeerteen political players, and equally outraged masses in 
Somaliland who felt betrayed by their southern brethren with whom they ‘sacrificed’ 
and ‘surrendered’ their sovereignty for the cause of the Greater Somalia.8 To the dismay 
of many Isaaq élites, both the posts of the chief commandant of the armed forces and 
the chief commissioner of the police forces were given to the southerners (Adam 1995; 
Ghalib 1995). 
 
The postcolonial politics of distributing influential power positions based on clan 
affiliations, as practised in Mogadishu, was not what the Isaaq élites in the North had 
expected. The configuration of the state power dispensation behind-the-scenes was not 
without flaws as two determinant conundrums faced the new republic. First was a 
postcolonial state restructuring and second was institutionalised clan politics. The Isaaq 
people felt that there was no meaningful political power left for the North as influential 
power positions had already been negotiated and distributed behind-the-scenes by 
Hawiye and Daarood political players and what remained was only leftovers. Since the 
state was captured – or so was shared – by the Hawiye and the Daarood, the zero-sum 
political structuration had nothing much to offer to the Isaaq, a clan that had produced 
more committed nationalists than Hawiye and Daarood combined.9 As clan identity 
became the basis for dispensing power positions, the new state itself became the 
producer of clannism, the principle of favouritism and nepotism for one’s clan members. 
How political players and brokers in the South were reading the new state structure 
was to be profitable for themselves personally and protective for their clans (focus 
groups, Mogadishu, 30 May 2015 and Hargeysa, 18 July 2016, Hargeysa). The fact that 
the new republic was constructed and configured on clan basis rather than the North-
South power sharing came to haunt forever. The Isaaq grievances were excruciatingly 
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 For the recent analysis on the Greater Somalia, see Zoppi (2015). 
9
 Household names, such as Haji Farah Omaar, Sheikh Ali Madar, Clement Salool Alex Qolqoole and Michael 
Marino, were unequalled in the history of modern Somali nationalism. ‘1DA LUULYO 2011 PART 2 London 
UK for Universal Tv tii ugu dadka badneyd ebid. qubaha', https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5hBvGe0DVU4 
(between min. 57:51 – 1:08:06), accessed on 19 July 2016). 
 
 
surfaced to the fore on 9 December 1961, when some British- and Egyptian-trained 
mutinous military officers attempted to seize power through a coup, , with the sole 
intention of seceding Somaliland from Somalia. The coup, though aborted, was triggered 
by three interconnected reasons: (1) the passing of the post of prime minister, (2) the 
perceived injustice over deferred military promotion and (3) the result of the 
constitutional referendum on 20 June 1961, where 54% of the Northern population had 
voted in opposition to it (Caddow 2001: 17; Del Boca 1992: 344; Drysdale 2000: 77; 
Dualeh 1994: 24). The state response to such legitimate grievances  were coercive and 
mainly focused on  suppressing revolts instigated by the Isaaq in 1963 and the Habar 
Gidir clan of the Hawiye clan-group in 1964. The revolts were an extreme expression of 
reaction towards the post-colonial political power dispensation in which they deemed 
heavily marginalised under the Daarood-dominated administration. 
 
The trial of the coup blotters in 1963 was intriguing as it became a replica of colonial 
court operating in a post-colonial space. The chief judge of the court was British with 
Italian prosecutors and Indian lawyers.10 The military-led coup in 1961 was was the 
first indicator that  that the union between the two territories were not founded on a 
firm basis. But the responsible manner in which the civilian government accepted the 
acquittal verdict of the coup plotters was also unparalleled  compared to other coup in 
postcolonial Africa where the fate of such officers would most likely have been a death 
sentence. The court process was a political drama on one hand, but a fair judicial 
process on the other hand. However, the fistful manner the civilian government had 
handled the clan uprisings evoked traditional clan rivalries, especially between the 
Isaaq versus the Majeerteen on one hand and the Habar Gidir and the Majeerteen on the 
other. The local police force in Dhuusamareeb led by Koosafaaro, a 
Daarood/Dhulbahante officer, with the orders of his chief General Mohamed Abshir 
Muuse, a Daarood/Majeerteen, carried the first colonial-type operation by unleashing a 
collective punishment campaign on the Eyr/Habar Gidir (Aroma 2005a). This led to the 
formation of the first armed resistance group known as Koofiya-Dhuub in Somalia.11 
From then on, the perceived marginalised political players from the Hawiye and the 
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 The main instigators of this coup were eighteen young military officers from the North.  among and other 
officers. See ‘Trial of Army Officers in Mogadishu’, Somali News, Friday, February 15, 1963, A4.  
11
 For an excellent summary reviewing these events, see Amina (1994: 99-109). 
 
 
Isaaq began to blame President Aden Adde for siding with their political rivals based on 
their marital affiliation.. 
The Disintegration and Development 
 
The Emergence of Somaliland 
The moment for which the northerners waited came in 1967, when Aden Adde lost the 
presidency to Abdirashid, his former premier. Somali politics changed in favour of the 
North as Abdirashid immediately nominated Egaal as prime minister. This was a 
ground-breaking solution for the ruinous relations between the North and the South. 
Egaal’s appointment was a landmark for two reasons. First it: mitigated the northern’s 
grievances and second re-established diplomatic relations with the British. In addition 
to leaning to the West, especially the U.S. and the UK, Egaal pursued perilous policies of 
soothing the acrimony over lost territories between the Somali Republic and its 
neighbouring states of Ethiopia and Kenya. He was in this unfinished business, when his 
government was cut short by the wind of the military coup that swept through most of 
the African continent. As the civilian rule, which lasted for nine years, was forcefully 
overthrown by a military junta, led by the Commandant of the army General Mohamed 
Siad Barre,—from the Daarood/Mareehaan—attempts to address the Northern people’s 
grievances were  were now in jeopardy (Dualeh 1994). Since Siad Barre perused the 
nuances of the Somali clan politics better than anyone else in his military junta, he 
accommodated the Isaaq élites from the North while isolating their Majeerteen rivals in 
the South. It did  not take  long for the Isaaq political players to understand that Siad 
Barre, who was previously a soldier both for the British and for the Italian colonial rule, 
was inclined to re-introduce  the colonial policy of ‘divide and rule’. Given the arming 
and political backing of one clan against the other, no clan or community was safe from 
Siad Barre’s wrath (interviews with army Somali officers, 20 September 2015 and 3 
May 2016; Africa Watch 1990; Adam 1992; Adam 1994; Besteman 1996; Faarax 1990). 
 
Siad Barre’s regime’s  twenty-one-year long oppressive rule till it, was ousted on 26 
January 1991;12  led to  upheavals that culminated not only in  Somalia becoming 
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 The declaration choice of the formation of the Somali National Movement (SNM) in April 1981 and the 
United Somali Congress (USC) in January 1989 was the reflection and the result of colonial separation of 
Somalia and Somaliland. 
 
 
stateless but also claimed by multiple entities, power personalities and polities. Though 
the Tillian model of ‘war makes the state’ (Tilly 2002: 35-60) was appreciated in 
Somaliland – and to some extent, Puntland, his ‘state makes war’ thesis was invalidated 
in (South-Central) Somalia. From the perspective of violent statebuilding, warfare 
prepares rulers to restrain rivals (ibid.). This holds true for Somaliland, but it has not 
been the case in Somalia where the war did not restrain contestants. On the contrary, 
whenever a conflict ended another began. Efforts of reconciling multifarious and 
miscellaneous warring armed groups and reconstituting the central state ended with an 
utter failure. Somalia saw the emergence of violent struggles for power between various 
factional leaders (the so-called ‘warlords’) throughout the 1990s, plunging into a  period 
of intermittent violent conflicts between the years 1991 and2000. While Somalia 
disintegrated a 
s a unified state, Somaliland, emerged  largely unified although lobbyists do not accept 
the fact that it was borne out from the state collapse in Somalia. Somaliland began to 
take a different route, but not without violence, even it was restated that it had chosen 
violence over politics (Bradbury et. al. 2003). 
The Poles of Power and Peacebuilding 
 
When Peace is not a Peace 
Following the grand conference of Bur’o declaration of the Somaliland independence, 
the Somali National Movement (SNM), which liberated Somaliland from Siad Barre’s 
remnants, began a process of statebuilding, but failed to restore peace due to internal 
power struggles. The project of statebuilding was more preferential to the SNM, as it 
was necessary for the appeal of international recognition, than to a peacebuilding 
process. A turbulent period developed where the SNM went through intra-Isaaq 
infightings as the new SNM government was violently challenged. Rather than 
beginning a process of peacebuilding, the new president Abdirahman Ahmed Ali ‘Tuur’, 
a Habar Yonis, pursued a statebuilding project. By the time Tuur had commenced his 
mission to build the state, everything had to be started from zero. Tuur’s mistake was 
seeking to strengthen the state in order to reach to the periphery while barely 
controlling the capital Hargeysa. His determination to secure income-generating source 
for the state pushed him to clash his defence minister Colonel Mohamed Kaahin, the 
heavyweight Habar Awal war veteran (focus group discussions, Hargeysa, 13 and 20 
 
 
July 2016). The challenge that Tuur had met from the Habar Awal led to armed conflict, 
when he was replaced by Egaal, the most senior Habar Awal political player. In contrast 
to Tuur, Egaal began a process of peacebuilding among the Isaaq clans. Since Tuur was 
challenged by the Habar Awal, it was expected that Egaal would encounter a 
confrontation with the Habar Yonis. 
 
Egaal was persuaded to return to his clan for support, but the fact that he carried out a 
political path contrary to the SNM objectives frustrated the process of peacebuilding. 
Having failed to obtain the support of the main SNM leaders, Egaal could not but need to 
use the former Siad Barre remnants to realise the ongoing process of the statebuilding. 
The challenge particularly posed to him by the so-called Calancas (the red flag group) 
had forced him to use the former Siad Barre intelligence officers to consolidate his 
power and expand authority. Following Siad Barre’s fall, these officers felt it difficult to 
survive in a pool of warring groups without a government, so they navigated ways of 
being useful to whoever in power. Yet Egaal sought to alter the political culture 
bequeathed to Somaliland from the Siad Barre regime into a civilian administration 
assisted by caaqillo, chief caaqillo and guurti (traditional clan headmen). It was not him, 
however, but the organisers of the grand conferences of Borame and Sheikh who had 
transformed the militarised politics of SNM into a civilian state system. To his benefit, 
these conferences helped Egaal to obtain the legitimacy to rule. For his government to 
get assistance in his day-to-day business, Egaal granted salaries to the caaqillo and chief 
caaqillo. Such incorporation drew directly from British rule. 
 
To rule was one thing, but to administer was another. To foster peace with the war-
weary SNM veterans, Egaal carried out demobilisation programmes for militias, while 
carefully consolidating his power base (Feisal Ali Sheikh, Hargeysa, 18 July 2016, 
interview). In contrast with Somalia, Somaliland was less resourceful because the only 
source of income was the Berbera Port and the Hargeysa airport, which were tussled by 
the Habar Awal and the Habar Yonis on one hand and the Habar Awal and the Edegelle 
on the other (Somaliland civil servants, Hargeysa, 17 July 2016, interviews).13 In 
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 Marchal (1996: 79) maintains that the conflict between the Habar Awal and the Habar Yonis was more 
economics and business than political. It is clear that a politico-economic factor overshadowed the long 
historical contestation between the two leading political players and businessmen of the two clans (Somaliland 
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Somalia, the control of towns outside the capital Mogadishu, such as Baydhabo and 
Kismaayo, was an asset securing the extraction of extorted income. The international 
aid was also flowing en masse into Somalia given the UN/US military intervention of 
Restore Hope. This exacerbated a competition for revenues. Egaal realised that he 
inherited a weak state and rarely attempted to use military power to defeat his rivals. 
Where Egaal and Tuur had civilian (political and diplomatic) background, the main 
competitors for political power in Somalia, such as General Mohamed Farah Aideed, 
Colonel Ahmed Omar Jees, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, Colonel Mohamed Nuur 
Aliyow, General Mohamed Abshir, General Mohamed Said Hersi ‘Morgan, with the 
exception of Ali Mahdi Mohamed, were military men who believed in military solution 
than political settlement (e.g. Aideed 1994; Ahmed 2012).14 Egaal’s unexpected attempt 
to intervene in Somali politics in 1999, when competing armed factional groups were 
‘doing well out of war’ (Collier 2000: 91-111), was obstructed by the sudden 
intervention of President Ismail Omar Geelle of Djibouti. 
 
When Peace is a Peace 
The literature on peacebuilding often focuses on the top-down approaches and thus 
tends to overlook indigenous peacebuilding initiatives initiated by women, religious 
groups, community members and other civil society groups (Roland 2004; Thakur et. al. 
2005).15 In Somaliland, a process of peacebuilding assisted by traditional clan elders 
was pursued, even though still some peripheral areas in Somaliland were not totally 
convinced for the statebuilding process. The blueprint framework for top-down 
peacebuilding process has not worked and even became unattainable over the last 
twenty-five years for Somalia. Attempts at creating peace from the top have failed 
repeatedly since the Black Hawk Down fiasco in 1993 in which the U.S. forces were 
bogged down by Somali National Alliance (SNA) forces of General Aideed (Elmi 1992; 
Hirsch and Oakley 1995). Peacebuilding needs to address human needs, but it requires 
institutions that not only create and maintain peace but ensure the rule of law. When 
there is a lack of police force and other formal institutions, the role can be played by 
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indigenous institutions. The traditional clan elders in Somaliland filled in this void, but 
disregarding them made peace in Somalia infeasible. 
 
The political stability in Somaliland can be attributed to clan elders and local clan 
conflict resolution mechanisms which are able to  arbitrate between competing political 
players in contrast with Somalia which forbids clan elders to intervene in political 
disputes. The twilight authority or the hybrid state system whereby the traditional clan 
elders have a political say on political matters worked well in Somaliland, whereas in 
Somalia the politico-economic power of the political players undermined the emergence 
of a rule parallel to their authority. While in Somalia they are useful for the process of 
selecting parliamentarians, in Somaliland traditional clan elders are a permanent part of 
the state structure. The Guurti, the clan council, plays an important role not only in 
solving clan conflicts, but also in resolving political conflicts (field notes, Hargeysa, 11 
July 2016; Mohamed Ahmed Mohamed Barawani, Hargeysa, 19 July 2016, interview). 
The Somaliland’s case ]has offered hope to people and political players to collaborate 
with the clan elders (Somaliland Today 2016; The Africa Report 2015). The Guurti have 
extensive powers as far as to legitimise the government in power, but the fact that they 
decide the extension of presidential mandate makes the state system very rotten. Before 
reconfiguration of the state in post-Tuur Somaliland, the government was subordinate 
to clan authority. The traditional clan headmen in Somali society were historically 
selected not through a direct or representative democratic process, but via clan 
consensus rooted in an egalitarian open discussion (Gundel and Dharbaxo 2006). In 
some places in Somali territories, such a selection procedure endured the involvement 
of even those who were mentally ill. To take one example, a notable Sultan of the central 
Somali territories, the outstanding Sultan Ahmednur Ali Guled, who reigned during the 
mid-twentieth-century in Adaado town, had once permitted a locally-known mentally-
deranged man to add his opinion to a matter of a sub-clan dispute (focus group 
discussions, Adaado and Godinlabe, 1-9 June 2015). Remarkably, the Sultan approved 
the judgement of the deranged man in his final verdict. 
 
The Come-back or Go-Back? 
Even though it had experienced years of contested and conflicting politics, Somaliland 
started as a ‘negotiated state’ (Hagmann and Péclard 2010; Renders and Terlinden 
 
 
2010) or a ‘mediated state’ (Menkhaus 2008) that developed into a hybrid state order 
combining modern and traditional modes of authority. The evolution of hybrid 
institutional development and socio-economic difference contributes to the Somaliland 
successes as a state. Negotiated settlement and solution to the political conflict between 
clans and communities led to relative stability. Unlike Somalia Brosché and Höglund 
(2016: 69), Somaliland has been struggling not to achieve peace and built a functioning 
state, but to achieve international recognition for that state. Why Somaliland needs an 
international recognition? Does it aim to capture international resources as some critics 
constantly claim? The international aid continues to fuel the political conflicts in the 
emerging new mini-states in Somalia.16 The fact that Somaliland authorities are not 
sufficiently concentrating on local resources reveals that they see the international 
recognition as a conduit for international aid. Somalia has perfected the portrayal of 
what Clapham (Clapham 1996: 20) considered the ‘letterbox sovereignty’ – which 
means the idea ‘that whoever opened the letters in the presidential palace received the 
invitation to represent the state concerned in the United Nations and other 
international bodies’. Reflecting on the Siad Barre’s dictatorial and destructive policies, 
some observers have argued that Somalia is better off without a state (Leeson 2007; 
Powell et. al. 2008).17 One important implication of this position is that, rather than 
viewing war as a ‘stupid’ act (Crammer 2006) – war is not necessarily a bad thing 
anyway – research should consider the other sides of the war and armed conflicts. Other 
observers – more sympathetic than anyone else – prayed for the Somali State to come 
back (Luling 1997).  
 
The come-back suggestion depends on the political path to take. It is all about how 
politics is structured and which state system is preferred. The civilian politics allowed 
Somaliland to come up with a new state upon a new African concept of a state, an 
indigenous forms of governance, whereas Somalia hardly appropriates the definition of 
state as an organised political polity with a single system of governance given the 
emergence of Galmudug State, Jubbaland State, Puntland State, the Southwest State and 
other emerging mini-states. Over the years, Somaliland has been struggling to keep 
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itself away from the proliferation of ‘federal’ states so contagious with Somalia. The 
Somaliland civil society leader states that the fragmentation of Somalia into fiefdom 
further erodes the prospect for Somaliland to-join Somalia as one single unified Somali 
State (Mohamed Ahmed Mohamed Barawani, interview, Hargeysa, 19 July 2016). In the 
federal vocabulary of Somalia, Somaliland is seen as a ‘one-clan project’ from which 
non-Isaaq clans would be politically marginalised sooner or later once the entity is 
recognised. But the Isaaq are not the only ones, albeit the loudest, who are advocating 
for formal independence from Somalia for Somaliland. There are quite supportive 
elements for the case in the Gadabiirsi, the Iise and the Warsangeli clans, even in the 
midst of such dissenting voices as the Dhulbahante. 
 
Peacebuilding and Nationbuilding 
Somaliland was built on a grievance-based ideology rather than nationhood identity of 
Somalilandness to attract for a wider communal and cohesive solidarity above clan.18 It 
is worthy of note that, when the SNM liberated most of Somaliland in 1991, they did not 
attempt to take advantage of the weaker position of the less numerous clans to conquer 
them and powerfully impose their role, partly because the various Isaaq political 
players – under the cloak of clan rivalry – were competing over power: who should take 
what. Although the process of statebuilding was largely successful in the Isaaq-
dominated territories, there are conflicting voices of people from Awdal and Sool 
regions objecting to the secession project (BBC 2016). This means that narratives of 
statebuilding and peacebuilding in Somaliland, even if negotiated, are not settled. The 
problem the Dhulbahante political players have with Somaliland relates to clan 
allegiance, for example the memory of Siad Barre’s rule in which they had a lion’s share, 
a fact that forces them to wait for a rule led by another Siad Barre and the question of 
the Harti unity which primarily attaches them with Puntland. The Gadabiirsi élites, on 
the other hand, integrated deeply into the Somaliland State system soon after some 
elements of the Dhulbahante and the Warsangeli joined their co-clansmen in Puntland 
in 1998.19 From there on, there was no language that could politically align the 
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Gadabiirsi with the Harti clan coalition formed to promote parochial clan interests 
contrary to their political alliance in the 1960s under the United Somali Party (USP). 
The only concern for the Gadabiirsi élites is to increase their parliamentary seat 
numbers. 
 
A further problem is that an existing set of Somaliland identity encompassing all the 
clans and communities has not born out with the formation of the state in Somaliland. In 
the capital Hargeysa, there is no common identity of Somalilandness, but there is an 
overarching one of unanimously unified ideology advocating for Somaliland as a nation-
state paralleled to Djibouti or Somalia. The assumption that ‘lesser educated citizens are 
more likely to embrace manufactured (sub)nationalist sentiments’ (Englebert 2009: 22) 
–  is to the contrary in Somaliland. The more they educated, the more they lobby to 
secede from the union and the less they educated, the less they harbour (sub)nationalist 
sentiments (field notes, Hargeysa, 22 July 2015). Since Somalia is still called a ‘parent 
state’ in the context of the language of the international diplomacy, when in 2002 the 
Somaliland authorities formally invited the African Union to assess its suitability for 
membership of the organisation, the fact-finding mission presented to the AU 
Commission that Somaliland’s case was ‘unique and self-justified African political 
history’ (AU Document 2005; also International Crisis Group 2006). The AU mission 
suggested that Somaliland’s case would not open the door to other secessionist claims 
on the continent, a fear that bars the other African States to recognise the entity. 
However, Somaliland’s success has invariably been gauged in contrast with the state 
collapse and the state failure in Somalia. When the two pictures are weighted against 
each other, the outcome is immensely obvious: anything compared to Somalia can 
suddenly seem to be a success, so much so the compared becomes exceptional. This 
kind of comparison and contrasting politics has hitherto worked for Somaliland. 
The Statehood and Stateness 
 
The Identity Politics 
As the above sections illustrate, the statebuilding and peacebuilding programmes have 
been long-term processes in Somaliland, in contrast with Somalia, where both 
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statebuilding and peacebuilding are quick short-term projects. The state is absent 
outside the so-called ‘green zone’ – the area around the presidential palace – and rarely 
reaches to the outskirts of the capital. In everyday life, discourses of stateness – to be or 
not to be a state – structure political messages with which people identify their political 
engagements with powerful political players who profit from those states. The state 
structure in Somaliland is built on a presidential system in which the president has a 
vice president, but in Somalia the president and the prime minister have transecting 
and traversing powers invested in them by the constitution (cf. The Constitution of 
Somalia 2012; The Constitution of Somaliland 2000). Such different state structures 
contribute to political stability in Somaliland, but instability in Somalia, exacerbated by 
the struggles for power through clan politics. How to satisfy clans and create clan 
balancing delay the development of robust state institutions in both Somalia and 
Somaliland. When appointing army or police generals, the Somaliland president has to 
consider an equal share between the clans (focus group discussions, Hargeysa, 14 and 
18 July 2016). Clan identity  (Brosché and Höglund 2016: 85) is ‘the most important 
political asset’ in both Somalia and Somaliland. Clan is more conservative socially and 
politically conventional in the latter than in the former. 
 
The conventional wisdom in Somaliland is that each clan has its time to assume the 
presidency. The would-be political players from the Habar Je’elo, the clan of the 
incumbent Somaliland president, will not contest for the presidency in the next 
presidential elections. It was thought that the time for Edagale or Arap has come, but 
the Sa’ad Muuse/Habar Awal, the most influential clan in Somaliland, argued for a 
legitimate case of their first turn to hold the presidency of Somaliland, as the Habar 
Yonis, the Iise Muuse/Habar Awal and the Habar Je’elo held the presidential seat. 
Though this could be our turn to eat (Branch et al. 2010), such accepted power-sharing 
understanding does not – and cannot – exist in Somalia where the intra- and inter-clan 
competition for power can hardly be settled. The Hawiye and the Daarood political 
players are unwilling to allow each other to take their turn and this leads to the state 
system prone to authoritarianism and to gradually develop into a dictatorship. The state 
in Somalia is violently contested not only by political players and businessmen from the 
Hawiye and the Daarood, but by others from a cluster of clans and communities, who 
compete within themselves in the name of their clans, sub-clans and sub-sub clans (field 
 
 
notes, Mogadishu, July-September 2015, April-July 2016). The conventional wisdom 
that the state in Somaliland is heavily dominated by the Isaaq clan-group, more cohesive 
than the Hawiye and the Daarood, makes the competition over power positions and 
state resources less violently contested. The other main factor is that, while there is no 
established powerful clan-group in Somalia, members of the Isaaq clan-group constitute 
a clear majority in Somaliland.20 
 
Power positions are loosely distributed in Somalia through the Four Point Five (4.5) 
Formula which requires four clan-groups; the Daarood, the Digil/Mirifle, the Dir (the 
Isaaq is included in this category) and the Hawiye to have equal power positions in the 
government. It is, however, the sole authority of every Hawiye president who he 
chooses for prime minister from the Daarood and who he chooses from other remaining 
clans for ministers, director generals, ambassadors, managers, so on. There are some 
rare exceptions to this rule. The prime minister and the speaker of the parliament use 
their influential positions to add three to five ministers into the cabinet. Most, if not all, 
of those selected are chosen not for their qualifications, but for their loyalty to the 
presidency. Despite Somalis recommended for government positions by the 
international community and Ethiopia, the loyalty to the presidential palace is much 
more important than the loyalty to the state, which is something that hinders the 
efficiency of state functions. As one advisor to the presidency admitted, ‘we seek people 
whom we trust and who show loyalty to us’ (presidential advisor, Mogadishu, 20 May 
2015, interview). Through this loyalty, ministers in Somalia take money derived from 
the ministerial budget to the presidency, while in Somaliland ministers go to the 
presidency to get additional money for their ministers (field notes, Mogadishu and 
Hargeysa, 2015 and 2016). This is not to sugar coat the state system in Somaliland 
which has its defects and flaws. Corruption is no less prevalent in Hargeysa which the 
police are claimed to have more discipline and experience than their counterparts in 
Mogadishu (Somaliland police officers, Hargeysa, 19 July 2016, interviews), a claim also 
reversed by Mogadishu police officers (Somalia police officers, 11 August 2015, 
interviews). From a direct participant-observation, the two police institutions are as 
corrupt as any other by referring to the same tactics of the Siad Barre regime to extort 
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money from the public (field notes, Hargeysa, 21 July 2016 and Mogadishu, 21 
September 2015). But the institutional corruption – buying and selling out votes – is 
more widespread in Somalia than Somaliland during the periods when the parliament 
sits to elect a president. 
 
Power and Positions 
Somalia lacks established political parties other than personal parties, while Somaliland 
has a rigorous but rowdy political opposition parties, like the Waddani and the Ucid, 
which had a say – considering the current political stalemate between the government 
part of Kulmiye and the political opposition party of Waddani – in the reconfiguration of 
the state system and distribution of power.21 The nature of interaction and 
advancement between the two political players in Somalia and Somaliland is not as 
visible as it seems from the outside. The discontinuity of the political players is a crucial 
factor in this regard. In Somaliland, the main political players – Ahmed Siilaanyo, the 
incumbent President; Saleebaan Mohamoud Aden, the Chairman of the Guurti (the 
Upper House); Muuse Biihi Abdi, the presidential hopeful, as well as the political 
opposition leaders Feysal Ali Waraabe and Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi ‘Irro’ – 
have not been changed since the 1990s and playing politics since the Egaal days. As the 
Executive Director of Somaliland Non-State Actors Forum (SONSAF) highlighted, ‘you 
have to be an old hand to have your place in Somaliland politics’ (Mohamed Ahmed 
Mohamed Barawani, Hargeysa, 19 July 2016, interview). Somalia, by contrast, produces 
a new cadre of political players in every four years. This makes statebuilding difficult 
and averts peacebuilding process to take root. As one elder in Somalia noted, ‘the state 
of Somalia was captured by political brokers and businessmen who crave for money 
much more than anything else’ (Mohamed Hassan Hussein, Mogadishu, 29 May 2016, 
interview). Once they join the political field, the new political players in Somalia grasp 
that they lack the fundamentals and ingredients to build a power base without resorting 
to the international community. However, states cannot be built on the sole basis of the 
donor shadow. As an academic at the University of Hargeisa pointed out, state 
legitimacy and public support are the prerequisites for a state to be considered as a 
state (Nasir Mohamed Ali, Hargeysa, 15 July 2016, interview). Legitimacy is crucial for 
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the post-war reconstruction and political stability of Somalia enabling the ‘weak state’ 
to function (Holsti 1996), but it cannot be achieved while people’s grievances are not 
addressed. 
 
The issue of recognition is very critical and conflicting both in Somalia and Somaliland, 
so are the stake-related issues of resources and representation. The stakes are shaped 
by the state system in place depending on the price of power positions have always 
been higher in Somalia than in Somaliland. Government positions in the latter are 
distributed through balancing clans (as in Somalia, to some extent), but they are 
occupied by people who were are selected because they possess political, economic or 
intellectual influence. One is accepted in the influential positions of power in Somaliland 
if confirmed to possessing one of three prerequisites: (1) a political career, (2) an 
academic profession, (3) or a rebel background. Somalia politics are structured such 
that if one does not have money to buy the influence for political office, one cannot enter 
the national parliament. Those who have the money and the means to influence the top 
political players in power could aspire to assume a political position in the government. 
Here, similar to South Sudan, ‘the prospects for ordinary members to influence 
decisions are strictly limited’ (Brosché and Höglund 2016: 85). Political players in South 
Sudan ‘are given prominent positions depending on how large a threat they constitute’ 
(ibid., 81). But this is not the case in Somalia, where there exists a ‘winner-takes-all’ 
state system that leaves little to rival powerful competing groups. Assassinations are 
thus rife in the capital Mogadishu to allow for powerful political players, who had 
already been playing in the political field, to eliminate their political challengers (Ayaan 
Mohamed Ali, Mogadishu, 7 July 2016, interview; Ibrahin Hassan Ahmed, Mogadishu, 31 
May 2015, interview). At Maansoor Hotel and Summertown, the famous political 
players in Somaliland seem not to have a fear for their security, as their Somalia 
counterparts in Hotel Jasiira, Hotel SYL and Hotel Makka Al-Mukaramah in Mogadishu 
(field notes, Hargeysa, 13-21 July 2016; field notes, Mogadishu, 19-25 May 2015). 
Sovereignty and Sorrow 
 
Externality of the State 
The internal actors alone have not complicated – and continue to complicate – 
statebuilding and peacebuilding efforts in Somalia, but the external intervention also 
 
 
plays a decisive factor. The support for armed groups, such as the Ahlu-Sunna and for 
the proliferation of clan-based mini-states by Ethiopia as well as the huge western 
intelligence presence in Mogadishu all contribute to the political conflicts in Somalia 
and generate a war economy deeply dependent on the outside forces. The international 
community and neighbouring Ethiopia have a strong hand in reshaping the structure of 
the state, while the AMISOM forces are nurturing the state like a life-machine. In 
Somalia, the statebuilding and peacebuilding projects have been engineered by either 
Ethiopia or the international community (IGAD Communiqué 2015; Somali Compact 
Report 2015). The dozens of peace and reconciliation conferences held for Somalia 
since 1991 are prominent cases in point (field notes, 15 October 2002, Eldoret, Kenya – 
9 August 2003, Mbagathi, Kenya). As noted, Somaliland’s was a negotiated state, but in 
Somalia the state has never become a negotiated other than super-imposed. This is so 
because statebuilding and peacebuilding from the top proved wrong in Somalia. The 
international community cannot be blamed for this trend; the local actors outsource 
their conflict to the international community to gain support of excluding each other in 
the process of statebuilding and peacebuilding. The contrasting patterns of 
statebuilding projects between Somalia and Somaliland indicate that, while the former 
one is an externally-imposed one, the latter is organic and home-grown. The 
paradoxical pattern and process of statebuilding and peacebuilding in Somaliland 
followed a framework that draws more from indigenous input than external 
involvement. 
 
There is intermittent international hand in Somaliland in contrast with Somalia where, 
nearly, every Western state has a presence in the highly-walled Halane compound in the 
Aden Adde airport (field observations in Halane 4-5 August 2015). The statebuilding 
projects in Somalia continue to follow unfitting Manhattan-type governmental 
procedures laid down by the UN bureaucracies. The drafting of the constitution for 
Somalia was even led by the UN Political Office (UNPOS) and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), which produced a Somali-owned – but not a Somali-
led – state.22 This led to never-ending building projects in Somalia, dependent on the 
donors’ desires to adopt certain measures for peacebuilding and statebuilding. The 
annual UN resolutions compel the Somali political players to preserve the Somali 
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sovereignty, but they do not tell Somaliland authorities to (re)negotiate with the federal 
government in Mogadishu. The international community avoids even to involve 
Somaliland in the process of peacebuilding and statebuilding in Somalia either to assist 
or offer experiences for fear of being accused of sponsoring the secession project. This 
renders the international community staff in Mogadishu to isolate themselves from 
drawing a lesson from the experiences of the state formation. There is a dispute over 
whether the experiences of the Somaliland statebuilding – one without fails – can be 
applied to Somalia where the political contestation for power remains much violent and 
rowdy than any other Somali territory. In Somaliland, statebuilding and peacebuilding 
are part of a single continuum. In Somalia, statebuilding is a business, peacebuilding a 
project, to reap benefits from the Western donors. Yet the international community 
remains reluctant to interact with the fact that where the state is a state endures 
unrecognised and where the state is not a state enjoys recognition. 
 
Redrawing of Colonial or Clan Boundaries? 
The empirical fact that Somaliland is now lounging for a case of redrawing back to the 
colonial border is a testament of the colonial nostalgia. Will the border between 
Somaliland and Puntland be a colonial border or clan border? Somaliland argues for the 
preservation of the colonial border line demarcation, but Puntland authorities have 
insisted on the traditional precolonial Harti clan boundary.23 Somaliland claims the 
belonging of the British Somaliland borders, but – from a paradoxical pattern, this is 
heavily contested by Puntland, the neighbouring semi-autonomous state, which is still 
theoretically part of Somalia. The creation of Puntland as a clan-state was a copycat 
adventure from Somaliland as far as its constitution is a document extracted from the 
latter, except that it permits the existence of ‘federal’ Somalia, while Somaliland has 
declared a complete divorce from Somalia (Mohamed Ahmed Mohamed Barawani, 
Hargeysa, 19 July 2016, interview).24 Emerged out from the building block approach, 
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Puntland pursues a decentralised state format for the collapsed Somalia proposed by 
Ethiopia in the mid-1990s.25 The limits and limitations of this format were attested by 
the fact that Puntland has contested borders with Somaliland and Galmudug. The 
perception that people in Somaliland may live without Somalia, but people in Puntland 
cannot, due to the latter’s past patrimonial affiliation with successive postcolonial 
Somali governments, is explained why one entity sticks to secession, the other to remain 
autonomy.26 The peace in Puntland largely draws from the fact that the entity serves as 
a political platform for the dominant Majeerteen/Mohamoud Saleebaan political 
players. The reason that no clan could dominate in the rest – that is, the South-Central 
Somalia – can be attributed to the recurring conflicts in that part of Somalia. 
 
The question of the relations that Somaliland has to have with Puntland makes it 
susceptible to armed conflict. It also exacerbates the possibility or prospects held by 
most southern Somalis that  Somaliland may remerge with Somalia. However, the 
majority of Somaliland people have no memory of a unified Somalia. No coherent set of 
narratives seem to convince the people of Somaliland that reuniting Somalia would be 
better. This is because the conversations of the unified state have thus far failed to bear 
fruits. Rather, the recent direct talks between the two entities held in Ankara, Dubai and 
London hinted to the political players in Somaliland that their appeal to recognition may 
bear fruit sooner or later (Hiiraan Online 2016; IRIN 2016). If Somaliland follows the 
path of South Sudan’s, such an endeavour is thought to be legitimising an 
internationally-observed divorce. Bearing in mind their stable state in the volatile Horn 
region, people in Somaliland have convinced themselves that such unrivalled attributes 
may eventually lead to international recognition (focus group discussions, Hargeysa, 23 
July 2016). The most difficult aspect is how they could protect their hard-earned gains 
from the contemporary political bickering of the old Siad Barre school political players. 
Hitherto Somaliland people have drawn one important element from their recent 
history: that the most valuable commodity they export to the region is peace (Hesse 
2010: 343-62; Huliaras 2002: 157-182; International Crisis Group 2006). The 
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understanding of the public and the political players is that, if peace is destroyed in the 
contemporary politicised disputes of who should take what from whom to where, it 
would be difficult for the secession project to succeed. 
 
The problem in Somaliland is that there are no signs of forgiveness as that all southern 
Somalis are held responsible for the crimes committed by the Siad Barre regime 
(Abdirahman Abdullahi Mohamed, Viber conversation, 17 July 2016). By contrast, in 
Rwanda, genocide survivors tend to forgive even those who cut off their beloved family 
members’ heads and this popular forgiveness led the country to emerge from the most 
genocidal field in Africa to the least murderous space in Africa (Rettig 2008). In 
Kheyriyadda, the city centre of Hargeysa, there stands tall a war aircraft with a Somali 
national flag on both sides epitomising Siad Barre’s war aircrafts that launched 
airstrikes on the town while flying from the Hargeysa airport (field notes, Hargeysa, 11 
July 2016). The symbol of the real MiG17 war aircraft is decorated with colourful 
expressions of people being massacred by the Siad Barre regime; a mother with her son 
on the back covered by waving Somaliland flag. The motto inside the symbol is Xus oo 
Xusuusnow (respect and remember). The drawings show an old man who lost his two 
hands and one leg during the Siad Barre regime’s genocide on the North (Africa Watch 
1990). The Daljirka Dahsoon (the unknown soldier) in Hargeysa is different from the 
Daljirka Dahsoon (the unknown soldier) in Mogadishu as the latter embodies the unified 
Somali State. The notion of seceding from the South has been alive in the North since the 
June 1961 referendum against which majority of people in Somaliland voted it, but it 
was nonetheless the unrestrained violence perpetuated by the Siad Barre regime that 
rendered the secession popular legitimacy among them. 
 
Grievances and the cause for Somaliland secession are interconnected, but do not 
completely articulate the long historical trajectory of the changing patterns of the 
colonial and postcolonial states. Given that Somaliland seeks for recognition to export 
the relative peace it enjoys to the Horn of Africa region, the political marginalisation, 
economic exclusion and genocide committed by the Siad Barre (Africa Watch 1990) 
have created a sense of unity among the Isaaq people, fostering and facilitating peace 
much easier than in war-torn Somalia. People evoke in their everyday interactions the 
‘holocaust’ committed by the military regime perpetrators about the case of Somaliland 
 
 
statehood (field notes, Hargeysa, 26 July 2016). The over-arching narrative sustaining 
the Somaliland secession had its roots with the genocide perpetrated against the Isaaq 
clan-group by the Siad Barre regime. One female cook reminds that ‘the Siad Barre’s 
legacies will never soon be forgotten in Somaliland’ (Luul Ahmed Hersi, Hargeysa, 22 
July 2016, interview). The consequences of the Siad Barre regime continue to influence 
the factional relations of Somalia and Somaliland. The conversations repeat a coded 
message that states ‘never predatory state again’, a code relating to narratives inherited 
by the memory of the military regime. Yet Somaliland authorities do not try to influence 
Somali politics to predict a favourable outcome. While having less say in the state 
structure of Somalia, political players from Somaliland in Mogadishu seem to be 
dismissive when discussed on the issue of the Somaliland secession (field notes, 
Mogadishu, May-September 2015 and April-July 2016). They insist that Somaliland 
cannot become a separate state, a narrative very vivid in Mogadishu. One Somalia 
government member from Somaliland went on as far as to assert that ‘Somaliland is a 
narrow-minded, backward project’ (senior Somalia government member, Mogadishu, 
23 June 2016; interview). This language was released not in public but in private, 
though. It is forcefully reiterated publicly by political players from Somalia and 




This paper has addressed the different trajectories of statebuilding and peacebuilding in 
Somalia and accounted simultaneously for the interplay between the similarities and 
dissimilarities of both entities. The paper has illustrated that the ‘precarious balance’ 
(Rothchild and Chazan 1988) of ‘perilous states’ (Marcus 1993) between the state 
structures, institutional clan politics and stakes in Somalia and Somaliland are 
profoundly contrary to each other. This fact will not only politically prevent the two 
polities to come to terms but practically make the secession project inexorable. 
Referring to Bierschenk, Twijnstra and Titeca argue that ‘African statehood is path-
dependent, and its bureaucracies best resemble “never-finishing building sites”’ (264). 
The African State, as Villalón and Huxtable (1998) pointed out, has primarily been 
posed in a ‘critical juncture’ when trying to mould from a sudden disintegration to a 
reviving reconfiguration. Countries undergoing or undergone violent armed conflicts 
 
 
warrant cautious and careful ways of seeking political settlements. Central to the 
functioning of the state is legitimacy and support. Scholars of international relations and 
political science (Bates 2008; Milliken 2003; Starr 2013; Zartman 1995) may be 
perplexed to grasp the proposition that Somalia should be a sovereign state, the Somalia 
which its government was founded, formed, formulated and framed by the international 
community, the Somalia that enjoys legitimacy conferred by the international 
community, the Somalia that exists not due to, but because of, the dysfunctional Somalia 
that hardly unable to offer basic features of a functioning state in a Weberian sense 
(field notes, Halane, Mogadishu, 4-5 August 2015). Despite the insecurity prevailing in 
the country, it is always claimed that the economic potential for Somalia is high, 
although the grounds for this are not made clear (British Embassy Mogadishu 2014; 
Reitano and Shaw 2013; Webersik 2006; Webersik and Crawford 2015). 
 
Studies on Somaliland have been ever-growing to document the developments there 
since the late 1990s, when the newly-emerging state system in Hargeysa led by Egaal, 
an old hand of Somali politics, succeeded reinstating a contrastingly relative peace in 
comparison to the rest of Somalia (Renders 2012). The state structural patterns in 
Somaliland have always been distinct compared to those  of Somalia. Some observers 
say this was because of the two different colonial legacies: the direct Italian colonial rule 
and the indirect British protectorate rule. The French scholar Prunier (2010: 35-49) has 
postulated that, given the failures of Somalia, the major reason why Somaliland remains 
successful in the foundation of forming a unique state – despite the failures of Somalia – 
is the idiosyncratic make-up of the two (British and the Italian) colonial systems. 
Presumably, Italian scholars, such as Federico Battera, Angelo Del Boca, Cristina 
Ercolessi, Antonio Morone, Giampaolo Calchi Novati, Paulo Tripodi and Alessandro 
Triulzi, would perhaps contest such a provocative premise espousing that the 
contemporary dissolution bequeathed to Somalia was due to Italian legacy. The paths 
and patterns of Somalia and Somaliland have not only been shaped by colonial state 
structures alone. Even if they confronted two contrasting colonial rules, their colonial 
construction was reshaped by the subsequent postcolonial institutionalised clan 
politics. Following the collapse of the Siad Barre regime, Somalia and Somaliland turned 
two different roots of state reconstruction. Somalia is still at war with itself complicated 
by the competition for power and chronic corruption. Today, Somalia is no longer a 
 
 
state, not even a country, but a geographical zone fought over  by the federal 
government of Somalia versus Al-Shabaab and the international community versus Al-
Shabaab through unending contestation. Somaliland has also its own limitations. The 
reason why Somaliland should join Somalia and why it joined The Somali Republic has 
not yet been clarified. The political heat cooking up in Hargeysa over power competition 
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 The most intricate political problem facing Somaliland today is Siilaanyo’s leadership. Siilaanyo was a former 
Siadist bar excellence. He worked for the dictator for 12 consecutive years but his six years with the SNM 
compensated this. However, in April 1988, he fled to London when the SNM would have to conduct the most 
massive and major assault to intercept Siad Barre’s near annihilation against the Isaaq people. Where was his 
decisive leadership skills when needed most? When the French scholar Gérard Prunier was travelling with the 
SNM, eating and observing with them, despite mines were exploding on the way, Siilaanyo was sleeping in his 
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